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ABSTRACT
We propose a statistical model for weighted temporal networks capable
of measuring the level of heterogeneity in a financial system. Our model fo-
cuses on the level of diversification of financial institutions; that is, whether
they are more inclined to distribute their assets equally among partners, or
if they rather concentrate their commitment towards a limited number of
institutions. Crucially, a Markov property is introduced to capture time de-
pendencies and to make our measures comparable across time. We apply the
model on an original dataset of Austrian interbank exposures. The temporal
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span encompasses the onset and development of the financial crisis in 2008 as
well as the beginnings of European sovereign debt crisis in 2011. Our analysis
highlights an overall increasing trend for network homogeneity, whereby core
banks have a tendency to distribute their market exposures more equally
across their partners.
Keywords: Latent Variable Models, Dynamic Networks, Austrian Interbank
Market, Systemic Risk, Bayesian Inference
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Introduction
During the past 10 years, the EU was hit by two major financial crises.
In 2008, the problems started initially in the US subprime mortgage market
and were partially caused by lax regulation and overly confident debt ratings.
The source of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011, however, was most
likely private debt arising from property bubble and resulting in government
bailouts. The lack of a common fiscal union in the EU did not help with the
situation, which resulted in the European central bank providing cheap loans
to maintain a steady cash flow between EU banks. During these turbulent
times, European banks were facing high levels of uncertainty. It was not
clear which counterparty would remain solvent in the foreseeable future and
even sovereign bonds were no longer considered the safest option. In the face
of these unfavorable conditions, the banks were forced to reconsider their
interbank investments and re-adjust their portfolios in order to account for
the change in the economic situation.
In this paper, we study an original dataset of interbank exposures in Aus-
tria between the spring of 2008 and autumn of 2011. Namely, we introduce a
dynamic network model to analyze banks exposures’ diversification patterns
as well as the overall trend towards diversification in the Austrian interbank
market. To accomplish this task, we create an original latent variable model
that allows one to analyze weighted networks evolving over time. This ap-
proach provides us with a model-based measure of systemic risk locally for
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each bank, but also globally for the financial system as a whole. In our ap-
plication, we show that our measure provides a qualitatively different view
when compared to basic descriptive statistics. Tto achieve this, we resort
to an intuitive modeling of a single network homogeneity (drift) parameter
which we use to study the evolution of network homogeneity in time. Our
model is specifically designed for instances where a network needs to be char-
acterized by a single evolving variable, or when one is interested in obtaining
a model-based quantitative measurement of the inter-temporal development
of network homogeneity.
It is important to understand that a change in a financial network struc-
ture can have far-reaching and non-trivial consequences. To illustrate this
fact further, consider a hypothetical financial network of four institutions
(banks) represented by nodes and their mutual financial exposures (debt)
represented by edges. In this simple example, connections are symmetric
and every bank splits its investment among its neighbors equally. Further-
more, banks are required by a regulator to always keep a capital buffer to
account for unexpected withdrawals, unfavorable economic conditions and
other factors. Therefore, we assume that an institution remains safe un-
less it loses at least half of its investment. If that happens, the institution
gets bankrupt and it might further negatively affect other banks in the net-
work. To see how network structure affects the overall stability, consider
a case where one of these four banks gets affected by an exogenous shock
such that it has to declare bankruptcy. In such case, its neighbors will not
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get their respective investment and might suffer the same fate, putting their
own neighbors in danger. This contagious behavior is dependent on how the
banks are linked together, which illustrates the importance of structure when
addressing questions on systemic importance and financial stability.
For the hypothetical case of four banks, there are 11 different network
structures that can possibly occur: a subset of these are shown in Figure
0.1. In the case shown in Figure 0.1a, there is no danger of contagion since
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 0.1. Different loan network structures on a set of four banks.
there are no edges to propagate shocks. An analogical result follows from the
network shown in Figure 0.1c, where a failure of one node is not sufficient
to take down the rest because every other institution only loses one third of
its investment. Problems arise in intermediately connected systems such as
0.1b, where an initial shock wipes out the whole system.
This basic example hints at a much more complex issue of network stabil-
ity that has been extensively studied by financial regulators in the past two
decades. More importantly, it highlights that the level of diversification in a
system may play a crucial role in determining its stability and that assess-
ment of this trait for observed networks can prove challenging. In this paper,
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we address this impasse, introducing a statistical model which is specifically
designed to measure the diversification of a financial system, hence obtaining
a measure for one of the facets of systemic risk.
This paper bridges two distinct academic fields. On the one hand, we
strive to contribute towards the established literature on systemic risk and
financial networks. This strand of literature has often focused on the stability
of financial systems as well as the possibility of contagious bankruptcies sim-
ilar to our simple example above. Research papers on this subject have been
published by both academics in finance as well as market regulators.1 On
the other hand, we also contribute towards theoretical papers dealing with
latent variable modeling of network data. The method we propose borrows
from and contributes to both fields, proposing a new perspective on systemic
risk.
One of the earliest papers on the topic of systemic risk in finance was
the work of Allen and Gale (2000), who have shown that the structure of
the interbank market is important for the evaluation of possible contagious
bankruptcies. Later on, Gai and Kapadia (2010) extended their work from
a simple model of four institutions to a financial network of an arbitrary
size. Other notable papers on systemic risk include, for example, Glasserman
and Young (2016) or Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), while
Upper (2011) provides an excellent survey of regulatory-published scientific
1This includes various country-specific central banks as well as the European Central
Bank and the FED. Additional research has been undertaken by the Bank for International
Settlements or the International Monetary Fund.
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reports on the subject. With respect to the questions on diversification, we
refer the reader to Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) and Frey and Hledik
(2014) where a nontrivial relationship between diversification and contagious
defaults is presented, or to Goncharenko, Hledik, and Pinto (2015) where
banks endogenously choose their level of diversification in an equilibrium
setting. Our paper relates to these works, since it is the structure of a
financial network we are studying, while exploring the questions regarding
diversification at the same time. We further add to these papers introducing
a new generative mechanism and a modelling framework where diversification
and homogeneity of the system can be studied inter-temporally.
As we have mentioned before, our paper also contributes to the research
on latent variable modeling. Prominent examples include the latent position
models of Hoff, Raftery, and Handcock (2002), later extended to the dynamic
framework by Sarkar and Moore (2006), and the latent stochastic blockmod-
els (Nowicki and Snijders, 2001) extended to a dynamic framework by Yang,
Chi, Zhu, Gong, and Jin (2011), Xu and Hero (2014) and Matias and Miele
(2017), among others. These latent variable models possess a number of
desirable theoretical features, as illustrated in Rastelli, Friel, and Raftery
(2016) and Daudin, Picard, and Robin (2008), respectively.
Our approach also shares a number of similarities with other recent pa-
pers that apply a latent variable framework on various types of network
data. These include among others Friel, Rastelli, Wyse, and Raftery (2016),
where the authors introduce a dynamic latent position model to measure
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the financial stability of the Irish Stock Exchange; Sewell and Chen (2016)
who introduce a modeling framework for dynamic weighted networks; but
also McLaughlin and EmBree (2018), where the authors propose a frame-
work to reconstruct a collaboration network. Further related works include
Chakrabarti (2017), where incentives of twitter users are analyzed; Ji and
Jin (2016) where meta-analysis of citations in statistics papers are conducted;
and Xin, Zhu, and Chipman (2017), where compatibility of basketball players
are analyzed via a network model. Lastly, we also contribute to the literature
on the stability of the Austrian interbank market. Other works in this area
include Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006), Puhr, Seliger, and Sigmund
(2014) and Boss, Elsinger, Summer, and Thurner (2004) who have looked at
possible contagious effects and descriptive statistics of the Austrian financial
network. We extend their work by creating a statistical model of network
evolution.
1 Data and Exploratory Analysis
In this paper, we use a unique dataset obtained by the Austrian National
Bank which contains quarterly observations of the Austrian Interbank Market
for a period of four years (from spring of 2008 until autumn of 2011). More
precisely, the dataset contains mutual claims between any two of N = 800
Austrian banks during the corresponding quarter, resulting in 16 observations
of the financial network. All of the banks considered existed throughout the
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whole period.
In order to comply with the privacy rules of the Austrian National Bank,
the data is anonymized such that the true identities of banks in the system
are hidden and replaced by non-descriptive IDs. Moreover, we are unable
to see the true values of banks’ mutual claims, only their scaled equivalents.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of our model, the true values of connections in
the financial network are not required, as we only need their relative size for
a meaningful statistical analysis. In order to better clarify these concepts,
we introduce the following terminology.
A dynamic network of interbank exposures is a sequence of graphs where,
for each time frame, the nodes correspond to banks and the edges correspond
to the connections between them. In particular, the edges are directed and
carry positive values indicating the claim of one bank to another. We note
that an observed network of interbank exposures between N banks over T
time frames may be represented as a collection of adjacency matrices of the
same size N ×N , as in the following definition:
Definition 1.1. A sequence of true exposures E = {Et}t∈T defined on the set
of nodes V over the timespan T consists of adjacency matrices Et ∀t ∈ T
with elements e
(t)
ij for t ∈ T , i ∈ V, j ∈ V, where e(t)ij corresponds to the
financial exposure of bank i towards bank j in period t.
For the case of the Austrian interbank market, the adjacency matrix
Et would contain the true values of all mutual claims between any two of
N = 800 Austrian banks at the corresponding time frame. However, as
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explained earlier, we are unable to observe the true exposures due to privacy
policy of the Austrian National Bank. For the purpose of this paper, we
will therefore be working with the sequence Y which corresponds to relative
exposures from the creditor bank’s point of view. More specifically, this
transformation constricts the edge weights in our networks to a [0,1] interval,
while keeping the sum of all exposures of a given bank equal to 1. For further
details on the proper data transformation, description and derivation of Y ,
please refer to the Appendix.
Additionally, we will be working with both the full dataset of 800 institu-
tions (OeNB 800) as well as its subsample containing only the top 100 most
heavily connected institutions which we will refer to as OeNB 100. Again,
for further details on how we select the systemically relevant banks as well
as the definition of bank relevance, refer to the Appendix.
We plot the evolution of the average bank relevance in Figure 1.1. Since
the measure is directly proportional to the respective sizes of interbank ex-
posures, we see a sharp drop in the second half of 2008 as a direct effect of
the financial crisis. This drop corresponds to banks limiting the overall size
of their exposures significantly in fear of counterparty risk.
In order to have a better picture about the data, we have conducted
a brief exploratory analysis of our dataset. In particular, it is interesting
to see the evolution of connections in the sample. Table 1 and Figure 1.2
contain brief descriptive statistics, where one can see the number as well as
magnitude of connections as a function of time. The number of connections
10
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Figure 1.1. Bank relevance for the full sample (a) and the sample containing
only the 100 most relevant banks (b).
(2nd column) shows the number of edges in the network as of time t, while
the relative size (3rd column) depicts the overall cash flow in the market,
scaled according to the first observation. We would like to highlight the
second and third quarter of 2008, where a drop in the overall magnitude
of cash flow in the economy can be observed. This period corresponds to
the financial crisis associated with the failure of Lehman Brothers in the US
and the problems stemming from the housing market. Interestingly, in the
Austrian interbank market, the overall number of connections does not seem
to be affected by these events as much as their size. This shows that, albeit
Austrian banks have reduced their mutual exposures significantly, they were
rarely completely cut off. Another important period is during the second and
third quarter of 2011, which is roughly when the European sovereign debt
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crisis started. At the first glance, there does not seem to be much in relation
to this event in our data. However, as we shall see later, our main model
will provide further insight regarding the trend in diversification during this
period.
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Figure 1.2. Number of connections and their relative size in time.
In interbank markets, it is common to observe disassortative properties in
the system, which roughly translates to nodes with a low number of neighbors
being connected to nodes with high number of neighbors and vice versa
(see Hurd (2016)) . This property in financial networks is quite common
and different from social networks where individuals with a high number of
“friends” tend to create “hubs” in the network, see for instance Li, Guan,
Wu, Gong, Li, Wu, Di, and Lai (2014). Financial systems also tend to be
very sparse. We observe the same patterns in the Austrian interbank market,
as can be seen from Figure 1.3.
We have observed several interesting patterns in the data which suggest
that using a more involved model could indeed produce some new insights to
the evolution of bank diversification. Since the main interest of our research
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Table 1. Number of connections and their relative size in time.
No. of Relative size
Period connections of connections
2008Q1 2952 1.0000
2008Q2 3109 1.0925
2008Q3 2993 0.1873
2008Q4 3028 0.3287
2009Q1 3178 0.4186
2009Q2 3177 0.5329
2009Q3 3156 0.7016
2009Q4 3188 0.5820
2010Q1 3157 1.1851
2010Q2 3194 1.1340
2010Q3 3223 1.0981
2010Q4 3126 1.0080
2011Q1 3115 0.9860
2011Q2 3825 1.1979
2011Q3 3820 1.2118
2011Q4 3778 1.1310
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(a) Adjacency matrix (b) Plot of a network snapshot
Figure 1.3. Adjacency matrix for the first time period, consisting of 2952
edges represented as dots (a) and a graphical representation of the network
snapshot for the nodes with at least one connection (b).
lies in the diversification of agents in an interbank market, we have also
looked at the evolution of bank entropy in time. For this purpose, we use a
standard definition of entropy as follows:
Definition 1.2. The entropy S
(t)
i of node i ∈ V at time t ∈ T is defined as:
S
(t)
i
def
= −
N∑
k=1
y
(t)
ik log y
(t)
ik (1)
Speaking more plainly, this quantity describes how an institution dis-
tributes its assets among counterparties. A bank with only one debtor would
have entropy equal to zero, since its relative exposure is one for that debtor
and zero for all the other banks. With an increased number of debtors with
equal exposures, a node’s entropy is increased and, for a fixed number of
debtors, the entropy of a node is maximized when its assets are distributed
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evenly among neighbors. Ergo, if two nodes have the same number of out-
going connections, one may view the one with a higher entropy as better
diversified.
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Figure 1.4. Distribution of entropy change in time.
In Figure 1.4, we plot the change in nodes’ entropies in consecutive periods
(S
(t+1)
i − S(t)i ). One can observe an increase in both mean and variance dur-
ing the second and third quarter of 2011, which corresponds to the sovereign
crisis in Europe. At that point, future bailouts of several EU countries were
uncertain which might have added to the volatility in the market. Interest-
ingly, no similar effect can be seen during the 2008 crisis. In our model, we
take all information from this exploratory analysis into account and we fur-
ther focus on the diversification part of the story. In addition to the analysis
on bank entropy, we extend this line of reasoning and create a measure of
overall trend in diversification. There are other ways of assessing the tem-
poral evolution of node exposure homogeneity. We have chosen entropy for
our exploratory analysis, as it constitutes a simple, clean and easily tractable
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approach, but one could easily turn to other measures, e.g. the Herfindahl
index as is common practice in economics literature.
This data is observed quarterly, from the spring of 2008 to the autumn of
2012, hence, T = 16 adjacency matrices are available in total (see Appendix
A for further details on data structure). The sequence of relative exposures
is important in both the exploratory analysis we have conducted as well as
in our main model.
To model the dynamic evolution of a network, we assume discrete time
steps in order to accommodate for our quarterly-observed data. A continuous
time model in the spirit of Koskinen and Edling (2012) would constitute a
possible extension of our model.
Throughout the paper, we deal with different probability distributions.
The normal distribution with mean u and variance v shall be denoted by
N (u, v), the Gamma distribution with shape parameter k and scale pa-
rameter l shall be referred to as Gamma(k,l) and a Dirichlet distribution
parametrized by a vector α shall be referred to as Dir(α).2
2 The Model
We use the relative interbank exposures y
(t)
ij from Definition A.3, assuming
that there are no self-connections such that when not stated otherwise, we
always work with t ∈ T , i, j ∈ V and i 6= j. As these are relative exposures,
2Notable papers on Dirichlet distribution and its usage include Minka (2000), van der
Merwe (2018), and Hijazi and Jernigan (2009).
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it follows from definition that they satisfy:
y
(t)
ij ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
j∈V:j 6=i
y
(t)
ij = 1. (2)
We propose to model the vector y
(t)
i· =
(
y
(t)
i1 , . . . , y
(t)
iN
)
as a Dirichlet ran-
dom vector characterized by the parameters α
(t)
i· =
(
α
(t)
i1 , . . . , α
(t)
iN
)
, where
α
(t)
ij > 0. Following the established standard in latent variable models, the
data are assumed to be conditionally independent given the latent parameters
α =
{
α
(t)
ij
}
i,j,t
. Hence, the model likelihood reads as follows:
LY (α) =
T∏
t=1
N∏
i=1
Γ
(∑
j y
(t)
ij
)
∏
j Γ
(
y
(t)
ij
) ∏
j
[
y
(t)
ij
]α(t)ij −1 (3)
where, again, j varies in V and is different from i, and Γ (·) denotes the
gamma function.
As concerns the α parameters, we separate a trend component from the
sender and receiver random effects through the following deterministic rep-
resentation:
log
(
α
(t)
ij
)
= µt + θi + γj. (4)
With this formulation, the model parameters µ = {µt}t∈T , θ = {θi}i∈V and
γ = {γj}j∈V possess a straightforward interpretation.
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2.1 Interpretation of model parameters
Before we move to parameter interpretation, we would like to note that
the effect of α on a symmetric random vector Y ∼ Dir (α, . . . , α). Namely,
it is important to see that the variance of Y decreases with an increase in
α. Since the values generated from a Dirichlet distribution lie in an (N − 1)-
dimensional simplex, low variance translates to yi ≈ 1/ (N − 1) ,∀i ∈ V ,
e.g. the values are more or less equally distributed. High variance, however,
implies that one of the components turns out to be close to one while all
the others are close to zero. This mechanic closely mimics the high-entropy
homogeneous regime and the low-entropy heterogeneous regime introduced
in Section 1, respectively.
In fact, in our formulation, the contribution given by µt + θi affects all
of the components of α
(t)
i· in a symmetric fashion. Hence, we are essentially
capturing the level of homogeneity in the network through a homogeneity
trend parameter µt and a node specific homogeneity random effect θi. In
other words, an increase in µt + θi corresponds to higher diversification of
exposures for bank i at time t, resulting in a more homogeneous network
structure. Vice versa, a decrease in µt + θi is linked with a decrease in diver-
sification which in turn results in a more heterogeneous network structure.
The interpretation of γj is similar. To see this, consider a non-symmetric
random vector Y ∼ Dir (α1, . . . , αN). In this case, an increase in a single
parameter component αj determines a higher expected value in yj, at the
expense of the other elements in Y. In our context, an increase in γj tends
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to increase the weight of all edges that j receives from its counterparties.
Equivalently, one can say that in such case the bank j becomes more attrac-
tive, in the spirit of other banks concentrating their exposures more towards
j.
To summarize, there is a clear way to interpret the main parameters of our
model. Parameter µt indicates the global homogeneity level at time frame
t ∈ T , parameter θi characterizes the individual bank i homogeneity level as
a random effect, and parameter γj represents the bank j’s attractiveness.
2.2 Bayesian hierarchical structure
We complete our model by introducing the following Bayesian hierarchical
structure on the parameters we have mentioned earlier.
We assume a random walk process prior on the drift parameters µ as
follows:
µ1 ∼ N (0, 1/τµ), µt = µt−1 + ηt, ∀t > 1,
where ηt ∼ N (0, 1/τη) and τη ∼ Gamma(aη, bη). The hyperparameter τµ
is user-defined and set to a small value to support a wide range of initial
conditions. The hyperparameters aη and bη are also user-defined and set to
small values (0.01) to allow a flexible prior structure.
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The parameters θ and γ are assumed to be i.i.d. Gaussian variables with:
θi ∼ N
(
0,
1
τθ
)
, τθ ∼ Gamma(aθ, bθ),
γj ∼ N
(
0,
1
τγ
)
, τγ ∼ Gamma(aγ, bγ)
Similarly to the other hyperparameters, aθ, bθ, aγ and bγ are also set to small
values (0.01).
The arrangement of parameters in Figure 2.1 summarizes the dependen-
cies in our model graphically.
aη, bη τη
µt−1
µt
Yt−1
Yt
θ
γ
τθ
τγ
aθ, bθ
aγ, bγ
Figure 2.1. Graphical representation of model dependencies.
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3 Parameter estimation
Our proposed model has T drift parameters (µ), N diversification pa-
rameters (θ), N attractiveness parameters (γ), and 3 precision parameters
(τ ). We use this section to describe their estimation procedure.
3.1 Identifiability
The additive structure in (4) yields a non-identifiable likelihood model.
For example, one may define θ˜i = θi + c and γ˜j = γj − c for some c ∈ R
and the likelihood value would be the same for the two configurations, i.e.
LY
(
µ, θ˜, γ˜
)
= LY (µ, θ, γ). One way to deal with such identifiability problem
would be to include a penalization through the priors on θ and γ. One could
specify more informative Gaussian priors centered in zero, which would in
turn shrink the parameters to be distributed around zero.
However, such approach may also interfere with the results, since the
model would not be able to capture the presence of outliers. Hence, we opt
for a more commonly accepted method, and impose the γs to sum to zero.
This is expressed through the following constraint:
γ1 = −
N∑
j=2
γj. (5)
This new model, characterized by T + 2N + 2 parameters, is now identi-
fiable.
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3.2 Markov chain Monte Carlo
The posterior distribution associated to our model factorizes as follows:
pi (µ,θ,γ, τη, τθ, τγ) ∝
∝ LY (µ,θ,γ) pi (µ|τη) pi (τη|aη, bη) pi (θ|τθ)pi (τθ|aθ, bθ) pi (γ|τγ) pi (τγ|aγ, bγ)
(6)
We adopt a fully Bayesian approach, relying on a Markov chain Monte
Carlo to obtain a random sample from the posterior distribution (6). Note
that, in the following equations, the products are defined over the spaces T
and V , with the only restriction that j and ` are always different from i.
Also, 1A is equal to 1 if the event A is true or zero otherwise. We use a
Metropolis-within-Gibbs sampler that alternates the following steps:
1. Sample µs for all s ∈ T from the following full-conditional using
Metropolis-Hastings with a Gaussian proposal:
pi (µs|. . . ) ∝
{∏
i
Γ
(
eµseθi
∑
j
eγj
)}
∏
i,j
[
y
(s)
ij
]α(s)ij −1
Γ
(
α
(s)
ij
)

·
{
exp
{
−τµ [µs]
2
2
}}1{s=1}
·
{
exp
{
−τη [µs − µs−1]
2
2
}}1{s>1}
·
{
exp
{
−τη [µs+1 − µs]
2
2
}}1{s<T}
.
(7)
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2. Sample θk for all k ∈ V from the following full-conditional using Metropolis-
Hastings with a Gaussian proposal:
pi (θk|. . . ) ∝
{∏
t
Γ
(
eµteθk
∑
j
eγj
)}
∏
t,j
[
y
(t)
kj
]α(t)kj−1
Γ
(
α
(t)
kj
)
 exp
{
−τθ
2
θ2k
}
.
(8)
3. Sample γ` for all ` ∈ V \ {1} from the following full-conditional using
Metropolis-Hastings with a Gaussian proposal:
pi (γ`|. . . ) ∝
{∏
t,i
Γ
(
eµteθi
∑
j
eγj
)}
∏
t,i
[
y
(t)
i`
]α(t)i` −1
Γ
(
α
(t)
i`
)

·

∏
t,i
[
y
(t)
i1
]α(t)i1 −1
Γ
(
α
(t)
i1
)
 exp
{
−τγ
2
γ2`
}
.
(9)
4. Sample τη from the following conjugate full-conditional:
pi (τη|. . . ) ∼ Gamma
(
aη +
T − 1
2
, bη +
∑
t>1
(µt − µt−1)2 /2
)
. (10)
5. Sample τθ from the following conjugate full-conditional:
pi (τθ|. . . ) ∼ Gamma
(
aθ +N/2, bθ +
∑
i
θ2i /2
)
. (11)
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6. Sample τγ from the following conjugate full-conditional:
pi (τγ|. . . ) ∼ Gamma
(
aγ +
N − 1
2
, bγ +
∑
j>1
γ2j /2
)
. (12)
The random draws obtained for the model parameters are then used to
characterize their posterior distribution given the data.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
We ran our Metropolis-within-Gibbs sampler on both datasets OeNB 800
and OeNB 100 for a total of 400,000 iterations. For both datasets, the first
200,000 iterations were discarded as burn-in. For the remaining sample, every
20-th draw was saved to produce the final results. In summary, we obtained
10,000 posterior draws for each model parameter.
The first 100,000 iterations of the burn-in period were also used to adap-
tively tune the Gaussian proposal variance individually for each parameter,
to make sure that all of the acceptance rates were between 22% and 30%.
The variances were hence fixed to the these values thereafter the trace plots
and convergence diagnostic tests all showed very good mixing of the Markov
chain, suggesting a satisfactory convergence.
Similarly to many other latent variable models for networks, the com-
putational cost required by our sampler grows as TN2. We implemented
the algorithm in C++ and used parallel computing via the library OpenMPI
to speed up the procedure. We note that, for the full dataset, an iteration
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Figure 4.1. Evolution of the posterior mean of µt for the full sample (a)
and the sample containing only the 100 most relevant banks (b), with 95%
credible intervals.
required an average of approximately 0.75 seconds on a Debian machine with
16 cores. The code is available from the authors upon request.
4 Results
First, we study the diversification of the banks which translates to changes
in network homogeneity. The drift parameter µt, shown in Figure 4.1, ex-
hibits an upward trend for both datasets. This trend is in both cases more
pronounced during the onset of the 2011 sovereign debt crisis. Further-
more, we observe a sharper increase in OeNB 100 during this time period.
This signals that larger and systemically relevant banks were the ones with
a particularly strong reaction to the crisis in comparison to other periods.
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Interestingly, we do not observe similar behavior during the crisis in 2008.
In the exploratory analysis conducted earlier, we have seen a substantial
drop in overall size of exposures in 2008 and almost no such effect in 2011.
Paradoxically, 2011 is the time when we observe a large upward shift in
diversification, while the same effect in 2008 is limited at best. One takeaway
from this would be that Austrian banks have perceived the sovereign crisis as
a bigger threat than the 2008 crisis stemming from the US housing market.
Furthermore, the relative size of this effect is more pronounced in the OeNB
100 sample. This hints at the fact that bigger banks tend to react stronger
in the face of adverse conditions by increasing their level of diversification,
while less relevant banks tend to keep their exposures less diversified.
Besides the overall development of diversification in the system, we also
study the local interaction of banks in the sample. This can be achieved by
observing parameters θi which characterize their individual diversification
appetite.
First, we analyze point estimates of these parameters: Figure 4.2 shows
the distribution of the posterior means for θ. For both OeNB 800 as well as
OeNB 100, the distribution seems to be rather heavy tailed. This translates
to a system where the majority of banks exhibits low diversification, but still
a fairly large number of banks tends to diversify much more. In fact, Fig-
ure 4.3 highlights that more relevant banks tend to have a more pronounced
diversification, whereas small banks do not diversify as much. This observa-
tion further confirms our ideas about a stylized financial network where the
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Figure 4.2. Posterior distribution of θ for the full sample (a) and the sample
containing only the 100 most relevant banks (b).
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Figure 4.3. The banks with higher aggregated relevance tend to also have
a higher diversification of exposures in both datasets.
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disassortative behavior is very common.
A similarly heavy tailed distribution can be observed regarding the at-
tractiveness parameter γ (see Figure 4.4 for the distribution of the point
estimates, where the heavy right tail is apparent). In addition, Figure 4.5
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Figure 4.4. Posterior distribution of γ for the full sample (a) and the sample
containing only the 100 most relevant banks (b).
shows that, generally, θ and γ are closely related in both datasets. This
figure highlights that larger banks tend to be more diversified and more at-
tractive simultaneously, and, vice versa, small banks often play a role in the
periphery of the network as offsprings of a larger bank. A similar observa-
tion of heavy-tailedness in degree distribution has also been reported by Boss
et al. (2004).
As concerns the uncertainty around the point estimates, Figure 4.6 com-
pares the posterior variances for all of the θ with those of the µs We note
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Figure 4.5. Posterior distribution of γ for the full sample (a) and the sample
containing only the 100 most relevant banks (b). In both plots, the size of
each circle represents the aggregated relevance of the corresponding bank.
that there seems to be no explicit pattern and no apparent relation with the
relevance of the corresponding banks. We point out, however, that the two
plots are on two different scales on both axes, which is expected since much
more data is available for inference in the OeNB 800 dataset, hence yielding
more reliable estimates.
Finally, we also show the posterior densities for the variance parameters
1/τη, 1/τθ and 1/τγ in Figure 4.7. For both datasets, these plots suggest that
the drift parameter is rather stable over time, and that the diversification
and attractiveness are not particularly diverse across banks, overall.
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Figure 4.6. Posterior variances of θ and γ for the full sample (a) and the
sample containing only the 100 most relevant banks (b). In both plots, the
size of each circle represents the aggregated relevance of the corresponding
bank.
5 Conclusion
This paper contibutes to the networks literature by proposing a brand
new framework to model the evolution of dynamic weighted networks, and
to capture systematic parts of their development. Our application to the
Austrian interbank market gives a new perspective on the recent crises and
demonstrates how our model can be used in as a means to measure exposure
diversification and, hence, one aspect of systemic risk. Differently from Friel
et al. (2016), our measure is not affected by banks entering or leaving the
system, since our dataset only contains banks which are active throughout
the whole period. In our analysis we have shown that the Austrian market
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Figure 4.7. Posterior distribution of variance parameters 1/τη, 1/τθ and
1/τγ for OeNB 800 (left) and OeNB 100 (right) datasets.
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exhibited a sustained increase in banks’ diversification, possibly as a reaction
to the 2008 financial crisis. In particular, differently from a descriptive anal-
ysis, our model captured a distinct upward dynamic in network homogeneity
as a response to the sovereign debt crisis of 2011. These findings may be of
a particular use to regulators and central banks to assess and design future
policy.
Our results also showed that the roles played by the different banks can be
vastly different, particularly in the context of exposure diversification. Our
findings emphasize that larger banks, which are generally more susceptible
to systemic risk, tend to use more conservative strategies and to spread out
evenly their credit risks.
One limitation of our modeling framework is that it only focuses on the
relative exposures, hence discarding the real magnitudes of the claims. Future
extensions of this work may consider a joint modeling of the exposure values
and how they are diversified among neighbors.
Another possible extension of our framework would include a more so-
phisticated prior structure on the model parameters. For example, one may
define a clustering problem on the banks, where different clusters are char-
acterized by different network homogeneity drifts µ.
Finally, we would like to remark that the Dirichlet likelihood specifica-
tion is not the only possible one. Besides, the Dirichlet distribution is known
to exhibit very little flexibility, since, when the variance is large, it tends
to assign most of the probability density to the highest entropy configura-
32
tions. This does not necessarily reflect the features exhibited by the data.
However, we argue that in our application the Dirichlet assumption is very
reasonable, and, more importantly, it provides a convenient framework with
a straightforward interpretation of the model parameters.
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Appendices
A Data Transformation
The source data from the Austrian National Bank is in the form of four
variables: a timestamp, an ID of a lender bank, an ID of a borrower, and
the relative exposure from one towards the other. We use the term relative
since the largest exposure in each time period is assumed to be of size 1,
and all other exposures in that time period are scaled accordingly to keep
their relative size unchanged. As a result, in each time-period, all exposures
are located in a (0, 1] interval with the highest exposure attaining a value of
1. Formally, making use of Definition 1.1 for true exposures, the observable
data in our sample can be viewed as a dynamic adjacency matrix D:
Definition A.1. A sequence of observable exposures D = {Dt}t∈T on the set
of nodes V over the timespan T is defined as follows:
d
(t)
ij
def
=
e
(t)
ij
maxk,l e
(t)
kl
∀i, j, k, l ∈ V ,∀t ∈ T (13)
It is not possible to make inter-temporal analysis of changes in exposures
while working directly with sequence D, because every exposure is scaled
against the highest exposure in its time period. In order to circumvent this
issue and obtain information which is comparable in time, we have devised
the following procedure.
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We make an assumption about the stability of the Austrian market.
Namely, when looking at the change of a particular edge value between two
consecutive periods from d
(t)
ij to d
(t+1)
ij , the ratio
d
(t)
ij
d
(t+1)
ij
with highest likelihood
of occurrence in the sample corresponds to banks keeping the absolute value
of their exposures unchanged. Indeed, after examining this ratio in all con-
secutive periods, we observe that the most frequent value is situated in the
middle of the sample and is always a clear outlier in terms of likelihood of
occurrence.3
It’s straightforward to rescale the whole dataset using this procedure. De-
spite the fact that we still cannot observe the actual levels of exposures be-
tween banks in our sample, we are now able to compare them inter-temporally
which is an extremely useful property. We will be referring to such rescaled
dataset as the sequence of absolute exposures and denote it by X .
We only have a single use for X , namely to create a subsample of “core
banks”. In fact, selecting a portion of banks which can be deemed important
allows us to see how the implications of our model are affected by the banks’
size. In order to do so, we introduce the bank’s relevance:
3In most cases, this value is around 1 which suggests that the largest exposure in the
network is mostly stable. An exception arises between dates 2 and 3 which correspond to
the second and third quarter of 2008. As this is the exact time of the height of US subprime
mortgage crisis, we believe that the “big players” in our dataset have been influenced by
these events, resulting in the change of their exposures and subsequent substantial rescaling
of the whole system. According to our methodology, the largest exposure in the network
has dropped to almost one third of its value in the span of two quarters, but it returns
gradually back to its former level eventually.
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Definition A.2. A relevance of bank i in time period t is defined as:
r
(t)
i =
∑
k∈N
x
(t)
ik +
∑
k∈N
x
(t)
ki . (14)
In other words, we define relevance simply as the bank’s overall sum of
its interbank assets and liabilities.
With a clear measure of systemic importance, we can now select a sub-
sample of banks with the highest aggregated relevance ri =
∑T
t=1 r
(t)
i . This
allows us to focus on the interactions of systemically important banks and
observe whether there are some unique patterns. We use the aggregated rel-
evance measure to create a new smaller dataset consisting of the 100 most
systemically relevant institutions and the connections between them. We
shall refer to the full dataset and the reduced dataset as OeNB 800 and OeNB
100, respectively4.
Lastly, for modeling purposes, we define the sequence of relative exposures
as follows:
Definition A.3. A sequence of relative exposures Y = {Yt}t∈T on the set of
nodes V over the timespan T has elements defined as follows:
y
(t)
ij
def
=
x
(t)
ij∑N
k=1 x
(t)
ik
∀i, j ∈ V , ∀t ∈ T (15)
4Validity of the OeNB 100 subset can be justified further by examining the overall
exposure of top 100 institutions. It turns out that the 100 most systemically relevant banks
account for more than 95% of all edge weights in any given time frame. In other words,
the 100 most systemically relevant banks are the ones responsible for the vast majority of
all exposures within the system, which makes their closer examination interesting
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To summarize, there are four different types of dynamic adjacency ma-
trices used in our paper: E corresponds to the true data with the actual
connection values which we do not observe, D represents the scaled data
where edge weights are normalized with respect to the highest value in each
period, X contains the scaled data where all edge weights are normalized
with respect to the highest value in the first period, and Y contains the
relative exposures of banks derived from X which makes them comparable
intertemporally. We are working mainly with Y as it contains the most useful
intormation we can get from the data.
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